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PERCEIVING GOD THROUGH NATURAL BEAUTY
Ryan West and Adam C. Pelser

In Perceiving God, William Alston briefly suggests the possibility of perceiving God indirectly through the perception of another object. Following recent
work by C. Stephen Evans, we argue that Thomas Reid’s notion of “natural
signs” helpfully illuminates how people can perceive God indirectly through
natural beauty. First, we explain how some natural signs enable what Alston
labels “indirect perception.” Second, we explore how certain emotions make
it possible to see both beauty and the excellence of the minds behind beauty.
Finally, we explain how aesthetic emotions can involve indirect perception of
God via the natural sign of natural beauty.

To say that there is in reality no beauty in those objects
in which all men perceive beauty, is to attribute to man
fallacious senses. But we have no ground to think so
disrespectfully of the Author of our being; the faculties
he hath given us are not fallacious; nor is that beauty,
which he hath so liberally diffused over all the works of
his hands, a mere fancy in us, but a real excellence in his
works, which express the perfection of their Divine Author.
—Thomas Reid1

In Perceiving God, William Alston argues that mystical experiences can involve direct (i.e., unmediated) perception of God, and can thereby justify
certain theistic beliefs. Alston explicitly limits his discussion to cases of
direct perception of God, but suggests that he doesn’t see any reason to
object in principle to the possibility of perceiving God indirectly—that
is, through the perception of some other object, such as a beautiful scene
in nature. He writes, “If God can appear to me as loving or powerful or
glorious when I am not sensorily aware of a field of oats or the words of
the Bible, why shouldn’t He also appear to me as loving or powerful or
glorious when that comes through my sense perception of the field of oats

1
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2002), VIII iv, 595. When citing this text (hereafter, Intellectual
Powers) we use capitalized Roman numerals to denote essays and lower case Roman numerals to denote chapters; all page numbers refer to the Edinburgh edition.
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or whatever?”2 Our focus in this paper is the possibility of such indirect
perception of God through perception of the beauty of nature.
Following recent work by C. Stephen Evans, we take it that Thomas
Reid’s notion of “natural signs” can help explain how God might be
perceived indirectly through natural beauty.3 Evans argues that certain
widely accessible features of the world serve as “pointers” to God, pointers
which can ground knowledge of God, but which are resistible to varying
degrees.4 Evans’s work focuses on the natural signs associated with three
families of theistic arguments—cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments—although he acknowledges that other natural signs might point
to God as well.5 In this paper, we develop the idea that natural beauty (i.e.,
the beauty of nature) can serve as a natural sign of God, thereby enabling
indirect perception of God. First, we give an account of natural signs,
drawing on Reid and Evans, and explain how natural signs can enable
the kind of perception Alston labels “indirect.” Second, we explore the
important role of emotions in aesthetic perception by both examining how
particular emotions can enable one to see things in beautiful objects (and
in the minds behind those objects), and considering what such emotional
perception reveals about the relationship between character and aesthetic
taste. Third, we draw on the previous discussions to show how beauty can
serve as widely accessible, though easily resisted, perceptual evidence—a
natural sign—of God’s existence and attributes.
1. Natural Signs and Indirect Perception
In order to argue that beauty can serve as a natural sign of God, we must
clarify what we mean by a natural sign. We begin with Reid’s account, and
then explain how Evans adapts Reid’s concept.
Most generally and succinctly, signs are pointers. In Reid’s language,
signs “suggest” the things they signify in the sense that they typically
produce in the subject a conception of and, in some cases, a belief in or
about the thing signified. There are two broad categories of signs: artificial
and natural. Artificial signs are rooted in convention. Natural languages
constitute the paradigm examples. When someone tells you a story about
a dog, the word “dog” automatically triggers your conception dog. As evidenced by the variety of linguistic constructs that signify dogs, the English
word “dog” does not elicit our dog conception by virtue of human nature,
but via linguistic convention. By contrast, natural signs are rooted in our
nature—or as Reid would put it, “our constitution.”

2
William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991), 28; italics original.
3
C. Stephen Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
4
Ibid., 12–17.
5
Ibid., 38, 149–150.
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Natural signs feature most centrally in Reid’s theory of perception.6 In
that context, he claims that sensations are the natural signs by which the
objects of perception are perceived. As Reid explains, “Every different
perception is conjoined with a sensation that is proper to it. The one is the
sign, the other the thing signified.”7 Reid defines perception thus: “First,
Some conception or notion of the object perceived. Secondly, A strong and
irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence. And, thirdly, That
this conviction and belief are immediate, and not the effect of reasoning.”8
So, when a person presses her hand against a hard object, the sensations in
her hand trigger a concept of hardness and a belief in the existence of the
hard object she’s touching in an automatic (non-inferential) way. This is
due not to convention, but to the fact that humans are hard-wired to form
and employ a concept of hardness and to believe in the existence of a hard
object immediately upon having the associated physical sensation. We
agree with Reid that sensations function as natural signs insofar as they
naturally and immediately give rise to perceptions of physical objects, but
we disagree that perception essentially involves belief (i.e., seeing is not
believing).9 Nevertheless, in what follows we will continue to speak of
sensations (and other natural signs) giving rise to “conceptions and beliefs” since we think the perceptions which sensations directly occasion
typically give rise to beliefs naturally and non-inferentially.
Sensations, then, are paradigmatic natural signs. They are signs inasmuch as they tend to give rise to conceptions of and beliefs about the
reality of the objects of perception. They are natural inasmuch as they
are grounded in human nature, not convention. Still, sensations are not
the only kind of natural sign Reid recognizes. Perceived objects also can
function as natural signs of other objects. For instance, this is how Reid
grounds knowledge of other minds. He writes, “Other minds we perceive
only through the medium of material objects, on which their signatures
are impressed. It is through this medium that we perceive life, activity,
wisdom, and every moral and intellectual quality in other beings.”10 By
perceiving the facial, vocal, and bodily features of other humans, along
6
We can give only a sparse account of Reid’s theory of perception. For primary texts,
see Thomas Reid, Intellectual Powers, and An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles
of Common Sense (hereafter, Inquiry), ed. Derek R. Brookes (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). For detailed analyses, see James Van Cleve, “Reid’s
Theory of Perception,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, ed. Terence Cuneo and
Rene Van Woudenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101–133; and
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 96–162.
7
Reid, Intellectual Powers II xvi, 199. For discussion of the relationship between perception
and sensation in Reid, see Todd Buras, “The Function of Sensations in Reid,” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 47:3 (2009), 339.
8
Reid, Intellectual Powers II v, 96; italics original.
9
See Adam C. Pelser, “Belief in Reid’s Theory of Perception,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 27: 4 (2010), 359–378.
10
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iv, 602–603.
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with the physical effects of their actions on the world, we indirectly perceive that those humans are conscious beings. In this way, the physical
features of humans function as natural signs of consciousness.
Alston’s discussion of indirect perception is instructive here. According
to Alston, when we see a person’s reflection in a mirror or their image on
television, we perceive the person in the sense that the “person can be
identified with an item in [our] visual field.”11 Nevertheless, our perception is indirect since we see the person through the mirror or television. For
Reid, sensations are natural signs that (typically) give rise to what Alston
calls “direct” perception, since they occasion perceptions without any
mediating perceptual objects (sensations themselves are not, typically,
objects of perception). By contrast, when one perceptual object serves as
a natural sign of another perceptual object, we have indirect perception.12
Of course, as both Reid and Alston intimate concerning the perception
of other minds—human minds for Reid, divine for Alston—indirect
perception is possible even if the second (indirect) perceptual object is
non-physical and, hence, perceptible only in a broad sense.13 This will be
important for our discussion of beauty as a natural sign of God, since
we think beauty enables indirect perception of God, even though God is
immaterial.
Finally, it is important to note that natural signs are fallible.14 Sometimes the sensations or perceptions that serve as natural signs for us are
misleading in the sense that we mistakenly take them to signify that which
they don’t signify. In other words, natural signs sometimes signify things
for us that they would not if our perceptual faculty were functioning
properly. Although Reid took natural signs to occasion perception (i.e.,
conception and belief) in an immediate, non-inferential, and largely irresistible way, he nevertheless believed that our perceptual faculty can
Alston, Perceiving God, 21.
Alston notes a further distinction between indirect perception and what he calls “indirect perceptual recognition.” As an example of the latter he cites “the case in which I take
something as a sign or indication of X but do not see X itself (X does not appear anywhere
in my visual field), as when I take a vapor trail across the sky as an indication that a
jet plane has flown by” (Alston, Perceiving God, 21; italics added). It is not entirely clear
what Alston means by “taking” one object as a sign of another without actually seeing the
second object in or through the first. The language of “taking” might suggest an inferential
process, but his plane example seems to rely on the distinction between simple seeing (or
seeing as) and seeing that (i.e., when one sees the vapor trail, one does not strictly see the
plane itself or see it as anything, but one can see that a plane has just flown by). On either
reading, since indirect perceptual recognition seems to be even less direct and presentationally demanding than indirect perception, we suspect that if indirect perception of God
is possible, so too is indirect perceptual recognition of God. We focus throughout on the
more demanding case.
13
We are not committing ourselves to the view that human minds are immaterial; but Reid
thought they were and yet thought we could perceive them. For discussion of Reid’s view of
the soul, see Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, A Brief History of the Soul (Malden, MA:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), chapter 4.
14
See, e.g., Reid’s discussions of the “fallacies of the senses” in Inquiry VI xxiii, 189, and
Intellectual Powers II xxii, 241–252.
11

12
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be improved by careful attention to the natural order of things and to
our own psychological/epistemic operations. This is especially so with
respect to “acquired perceptions,” which we develop by learning to
perceive some feature of an object with one sense that must originally
be discovered through another sense (as when we learn to perceive the
three-dimensional shape of objects through vision, though the original
discovery is tactile). He writes,
The errors we are led into in acquired perception are very rarely hurtful to
us in the conduct of life; they are gradually corrected by a more enlarged
experience and a more perfect knowledge of the laws of Nature: And the
general laws of our constitution, by which we are sometimes led into them,
are of the greatest utility.15

As Evans puts it, the disposition to form judgments on the basis of natural
signs can be “strengthened, modified, or overridden by experience.”16 We
agree with Reid and Evans that while we are justified in trusting natural
signs in most cases, we must watch out for deceptive natural signs, such
as sticks that appear bent when partially submerged in water, optical illusions (e.g., the famous Müller-Lyer illusion), and objects we have learned
to misperceive through faulty training.
Having sketched what Reidian natural signs are, we can now see how
Evans adapts Reid’s concept for his notion of “theistic natural signs.”
(Hereafter, we use the terms “theistic natural signs” and “natural signs
of God” interchangeably.) The first thing to note is that Evans retains the
central concept of a natural sign as “something that brings an object to
our awareness and also produces a belief in the reality of that object.”17
As such, theistic natural signs not only give rise to beliefs about God (beliefs which may be either true or false), but also make it possible to have
de re awareness of God.18 Thus, to use Alston’s language, theistic natural
signs enable indirect perception of God—they enable us to perceive God
through our perception of other objects. Evans suggests further that this
twofold function of these signs must have been part of the reason God
created the signs if they are going to qualify as bona fide natural signs.19
Secondly, as natural signs, theistic natural signs must be rooted in human
nature. That is, there must be a widespread, built-in propensity among
humans to take the signs as signs of God.20 This propensity, though, will be
“far from irresistible.”21 Indeed, Evans suggests that theistic natural signs

Reid, Intellectual Powers II xxii, 248.
Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God, 34.
17
Ibid., 35.
18
Ibid., 36.
19
Ibid., 35–36.
20
For an account of how cognitive science suggests humans are “hard-wired” for religion,
see ibid., 38–42.
21
Ibid., 37.
15
16
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may be even more subject to modification and easier to resist than Reid
seems to allow for most natural signs.22
Finally, theistic natural signs may be either mental or physical. One
mental example may be the experience of guilt;23 a physical example may
be the complexity of the physical universe.24
In sum, then, we follow Evans in thinking of theistic natural signs as
mental or physical pointers, grounded in human nature, which suggest
the reality of that which they signify. As such, they give rise to both conceptions of and beliefs about the existence and attributes of God, and were
created by God (in part) to serve this function.
Evans focuses on those signs he sees as being central to three families
of theistic arguments: cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments.
He briefly acknowledges that “the beauty or grandeur of a sunset over the
ocean or a mountain vista” may serve as a theistic natural sign, but he does
not develop this point.25 We extend Evans’s argument by considering the
way in which natural beauty might function as a natural sign of God. One
reason for doing so is that Reid himself suggests that beauty functions in
this way. Evans claims that he is applying Reid’s natural sign concept to
a new area of inquiry and that Reid does not use that concept in his philosophy of religion.26 This may be true, at least if Evans is thinking of those
passages in Reid’s writings that explicitly address philosophy of religion.27
But Reid does seem to acknowledge the reality of theistic natural signs, for
in his treatment of beauty he claims that beauty can suggest the conception of certain divine attributes and belief in God’s existence:
Other minds we perceive only through the medium of material objects, on
which their signatures are impressed. . . . The invisible Creator, the Fountain
of all perfection, hath stamped upon all his works signatures of his divine
wisdom, power, and benignity, which are visible to all men.28

We think Reid is correct that beauty can serve as a natural sign—and thus
enable indirect perception—of God. In what follows we develop and defend our own neo-Reidian account of beauty as a theistic natural sign. Our
account is neo-Reidian in the sense that it is inspired by Reid and draws
on his concept of natural signs as well as various features of his analysis
of beauty. We are, however, more interested in developing and defending
a plausible account than we are in defending a particular interpretation of
Reid’s view. So, while we draw on Reid, we will keep exegetical remarks
to a minimum.
Ibid., 38.
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 60.
25
Ibid., 38.
26
Ibid., 26–27.
27
On Reid’s philosophy of religion, see Dale Tuggy, “Reid’s Philosophy of Religion,” in
The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, 289–312.
28
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iv, 602–603.
22
23
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2. Emotional Perception of Beauty
Our account of beauty as a theistic natural sign begins with our epistemology of aesthetic emotions. We take it that an emotion is a kind of
evaluative perception—a seeming state—that involves the presentation of
some object or situation to our minds as being valuable or disvaluable in
a particular way. We follow Robert Roberts in thinking that each emotion
type has a characteristic “defining proposition” that includes evaluative
concepts linked to the emotion type.29 So, for example, in fear, the emotion’s
object is presented to us as dangerous or “fraught with aversive possibility,”30
and fear’s defining proposition is something like: “X presents an aversive
possibility of a significant degree of probability; may X or its aversive consequences
be avoided.”31 In anger, the object appears to be morally culpable for a serious injustice. In compassion, we perceive the object of our compassion
as a being of worth whose suffering ought to be remedied. Emotions, like
sense perceptions, have conceptual content, and an important part of what
it is to experience an emotion is to see—or, to use Roberts’s preferred term,
to “construe”—the object of the emotion as possessing the evaluative property that it seems, in our emotional perception, to have.
As Linda Zagzebski has recently noted, we tend to trust our emotions
much as we do our sense perceptions by judging (believing) that the
world is as it seems in our emotional experiences.32 She argues that while
emotions are not always trustworthy, we sometimes behave rationally
by trusting them. In a similar vein, Adam Pelser argues that emotion is a
basic source of epistemic justification; that is, at least some emotion-based
beliefs are epistemically justified.33 Roberts defends a similar thesis and
argues that, in addition to providing epistemic justification for evaluative
beliefs, emotions enable us to enjoy other epistemic goods, such as experiential acquaintance with value and the appreciation and understanding
such acquaintance grounds.34 We do not have space here to defend this
epistemology of emotions or the perceptual account of emotions on which
it is based. For in-depth discussion and defense, we refer the reader to the
literature cited above. Our aim is simply to explicate and apply the view
29
Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
30
Ibid., 194.
31
Ibid., 195.
32
Linda Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 4; see also Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 2.
33
Adam C. Pelser, “Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification,” in Emotion and Value, ed. Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),
107–123; see also Daniel M. Johnson and Adam C. Pelser, “Foundational Beliefs and Persuading with Humor: Reflections Inspired by Reid and Kierkegaard,” Faith and Philosophy
31 (2014), 267–285.
34
Robert C. Roberts, Emotions in the Moral Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), chapters 3 and 4.
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of emotions outlined here in order to illuminate the way in which beauty
can serve as a theistic natural sign.
As evaluative perceptual states, emotions enable us to see or recognize, and thus to understand and appreciate, various kinds of value in
the world, including moral, religious,35 and aesthetic value. This is not to
say that our emotions create such value (as the sentimentalists suggest),
but rather that they enable us to experience and, hence, discover objective
value that exists independently of our emotions. As axiological realists,
we think beauty is an objective property, a kind of aesthetic value, which
objects have or lack to varying degrees. We agree with Reid that “when a
beautiful object is before us, we may distinguish the agreeable emotion it
produces in us, from the quality of the object which causes that emotion.”36
Unlike many of his contemporaries who claimed that “there is no beauty
in any object whatsoever; it is only a sensation or feeling in the person that
perceives it,”37 Reid thinks we directly perceive the objective beauty of
external objects. He explains,
First, When [beautiful things] are perceived, or even imagined, they produce
a certain agreeable emotion or feeling in the mind; and secondly, This agreeable emotion is accompanied with an opinion or belief of their having some
perfection or excellence belonging to them.38

Although Reid never explicitly identifies emotions as perceptions, we
think the “agreeable emotions” we have in response to beautiful objects
function as perceptions of their beauty, with the qualification, discussed
above, that we reject Reid’s claim that perception essentially involves
belief or judgment. Just as our senses enable us to perceive the physical
properties of beautiful objects, such as size, shape, and color, our emotions
enable us to perceive the beauty of the objects, an evaluative property that
supervenes on the combination of physical properties.
Of course, beauty comes in many varieties, and people are often disposed to recognize certain kinds or instances of beauty more than others.
The fact that some people are perceptually attuned to certain cases of
beauty which others fail to appreciate is the grain of truth in the somewhat
misleading saying that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Beauty, like
other objective excellences, is not in the eye of the beholder in the sense

35
See Adam C. Pelser and Robert C. Roberts, “Religious Value and Moral Psychology,”
in Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology, and Sociology, ed. Tobias Brosch and David Sander (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming
2015), 375–394.
36
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII i, 573–574.
37
Ibid., 574. Some argue that Reid mischaracterizes his contemporaries here. Theodore
Gracyk, though, following Peter Kivy, shows that Reid has a “genuine opponent” in view.
See Theodore Gracyk, “The Failure of Thomas Reid’s Aesthetics,” The Monist 70 (October
1987), 466.
38
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iv, 592; italics original.
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that it is a response-dependent property,39 but rather in the sense that
some people’s “eyes” (i.e., emotional-perceptual faculties) are capable of
seeing instances of real beauty to which others are blind. Likewise, some
people’s sensitivity to beauty has been malformed in such a way that they
“see” beauty where there isn’t any. We follow Reid in thinking that disagreement over what counts as beautiful does not undermine aesthetic
objectivism (more on this below).
Reid identifies three kinds of beauty—novelty, grandeur, and beauty
proper—but recognizes that this list may not be exhaustive.40 We focus on
the latter two.41 In Reid’s view, grandeur and beauty proper are differentiated on the basis of the kinds of emotions they arouse in us. Grand objects
arouse in us emotions which are “awful, solemn and serious.”42 In the
case of the most grand of all objects—God himself—the emotion in question is devotion. With lesser grand objects, emotions similar to devotion
are aroused, which elevate the mind and inspire magnanimity. Two such
devotion-like emotions are awe and admiration. By contrast with grandeur, Reid thinks that beauty proper arouses emotions of esteem, which
we take to be a kind of low-level admiration, and love. As Reid puts it,
we may “justly ascribe beauty to those qualities which are the natural
objects of love and kind affection.”43 The foremost examples of beauty
Reid cites are moral virtues, such as innocence and gentleness.44 But he
also recognizes the beauty of intellectual talents, the beauty expressed
in the sound, color, form, and/or motion of inanimate matter, and many
other forms of beauty.
If we take esteem to be a kind of low-level admiration, we might, following Reid, identify four emotion types that seem to be natural responses
to grandeur and beauty proper: awe, admiration, devotion, and love or
affection. In keeping with the perceptual account of emotions sketched
above, we can fill out our account of aesthetic perception a bit by identifying the characteristic conceptual content (in Roberts’s terminology, the
“defining proposition”) of each of these emotional perceptions of beauty.
As we will see, these emotions are very closely related and constitute a
family of emotions concerned with excellence or greatness.
Awe is a perception of some comparative greatness or excellence exemplified in the object of the emotion. Roberts suggests the following defining
39
For discussion of response-dependent properties, see John McDowell, “Value and
Secondary Qualities,” in Foundations of Ethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 137–144; David Wiggins, “A Sensible Subjectivism,” also
in Foundations of Ethics, 145–156; and Shafer-Landau and Cuneo’s “Introduction” to these
articles in the same volume, 132–136.
40
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII ii, 579.
41
We ignore novelty because it does not figure in our discussion below. For Reid’s view of
novelty, see Intellectual Powers VIII ii, 578–581.
42
Ibid. VIII iii, 582.
43
Ibid. VIII iv, 601.
44
Ibid. Other moral virtues may be grand, such as magnanimity and fortitude.
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proposition for at least one paradigmatic kind of awe: “Greatness of kind Y
is important and X exhibits a surpassing greatness of kind Y.”45 Beautiful grandeur is just one of the kinds of greatness that inspires awe. Others include
vastness, intricacy, power, sublimity, and great human achievement.46 Awe
is not always a self-reflexive emotion, but sometimes in our awe we see the
greatness or excellence of the object as being beyond our ability to comprehend or appreciate fully. When we perceive an object in this self-reflexive
way, especially when that perception gives rise to a desire to understand
the object and its greatness more completely or know it more intimately,
the emotion is a special form of awe which we call wonder.47 As Roberts
explains, in order to experience awe or wonder, a person must exhibit
a “readiness to perceive the value of greatness.” It is this readiness that
differentiates “people who look at the Winchester Cathedral and say ‘So
what? Another big building. Let’s get lunch,’ from people who gape at it
in awe of the human achievement it represents.”48 Thus, the emotional difference makes an epistemic difference: the wonder-free folks have failed
to appreciate the value of the Cathedral; the wonder-full have tasted and
seen its awesomeness, via their emotion of awe/wonder.
Admiration is similar to awe in being a perception of some greatness
or excellence. Reid, though, thinks admiration is conceptually linked to
grandeur, for he claims that grandeur in an object amounts to “nothing
else but such a degree of excellence, in one kind or another, as merits our
admiration.”49 Yet for Reid it is not just the degree of excellence that matters, but also the kind. On his view, grandeur is essentially rooted in mind.
If the universe were merely “a fortuitous jumble of atoms,” Reid thinks it
would lack grandeur.50 The reason is that he thinks the grandeur of physical things is rooted in the grandeur of the mind behind them. As he puts
it, “those who look for grandeur in mere matter, seek the living among the
dead.”51 Reid may go too far in claiming that all grandeur is mind rooted.52
But even if our admiration of grand objects sometimes lacks reference to
any mind, a “mind behind the grandeur” can be, and often is, an aspect
of the grammar of admiration. That is, in our admiration we often see
beyond the grandeur of the objects themselves to the mind whose excellence is revealed or manifested in the grand object: “Wow! What kind of
Roberts, Emotions, 270.
Ibid.
47
Cf. Paul Griffiths’s discussion of wonder in Intellectual Appetite: A Theological Grammar
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 126–127.
48
Roberts, Emotions, 269.
49
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iii, 582.
50
Ibid., 586.
51
Ibid., 591.
52
Given the role Reid gives to ordinary language in making his case for the objectivity of
beauty (see below), one might expect that he would not think all beauty is rooted in mind.
See Roger D. Gallie, Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the Self (Boston, MA:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 172.
45
46
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mind came up with that?!” As such, admiration of the grandeur of objects
often amounts to indirect perception of the excellence of the mind from
which the grandeur originates. The defining proposition for admiration
would be something like: “Excellence of X kind is important, and Z has excellence of X kind, as evidenced in quality Y; it is fine for Z to have excellence
X.”53 Reidian admiration includes the “mind behind” in the conceptual
content of “X”—that is, X is conceived as a mind-rooted excellence. We
think Reidian admiration is but one form admiration can take.
If this is so, then it would make sense for someone to admire, say, the
Taj Mahal, without any reference to its creator. But it would be strange
to feel devotion to the Taj Mahal itself. We think this is because devotion
differs from admiration in being directly focused on the moral and/or
spiritual excellence of its object. More precisely, devotion is a perception
of something (typically someone) as being so surpassingly excellent as
to merit honor, praise, and loyal obedience. We think this is akin to the
emotion Roberts identifies as “reverence,” which he analyzes in terms of
the following defining proposition: “Moral or spiritual excellence is of great
importance and X possesses such excellence in a degree and quality far beyond
any attributable to beings like me; let X be praised and honored.”54 In this light,
devotion’s grammar differs from admiration’s in at least two ways: (1) the
excellence perceived in devotion is narrower (admiration presents its object as excellent in some way; devotion, as excellent in a moral or spiritual
way); and, since moral and spiritual excellences are personal excellences,
(2) devotion is even more mind directed than admiration is. So, even if
devotion to the Taj Mahal doesn’t make much sense “grammatically,” perhaps one could feel devotion to the mind behind the Taj Mahal, provided
one sees the conception and construction of such a building as a matter of
moral or spiritual excellence. (Whether such a view would be reasonable is
a separate question.)55
Love, unlike awe, admiration, and devotion, is perhaps best thought
of as an emotion-disposition, rather than an emotion itself. Still, we do
experience certain emotions that can be described appropriately as “feelings of love.” These are typically positive emotions in which we delight
in the beloved and see her as essentially wonderful, precious, or beautiful.56 Affection is perhaps the best name we have for such emotions. Just
as grandeur inspires awe, admiration, and devotion, less comparatively
grand (though not necessarily less beautiful) instances of beauty often
inspire love/affection, especially when that beauty is manifest in a person.
53
This is adapted from Roberts, Emotions, 265. The final clause helps distinguish admiration from envy, which includes the perception of some excellence as bad.
54
Roberts, Emotions, 268.
55
Thus, in our usage, if, say, a Muslim feels devotion to the Qur’an, this is devotion only
in a derivative sense: the Qur’an is being seen as an expression of Allah’s spiritual/moral
excellence. If Allah drops out of the construal, the emotion will be something like respect or
admiration.
56
Cf., Roberts, Emotions, 288.
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Beauty’s ability to inspire love is one of the central themes of Plato’s Symposium. And the close connection between beauty and love is reflected
in our everyday language: “lovely” is often a synonym for “beautiful.”
When our positive emotion is in response to a non-personal beauty that is
less than grand, and does not take any personal creator of that beauty as
its object, we might simply call the emotion “aesthetic delight.”
As we discussed with awe, only the person with a concern for and
perceptual sensitivity to the value of the relevant kinds of excellence will
experience admiration, devotion, affection, and delight in response to the
various kinds of beauty in the world. This concern and sensitivity need
not be conscious; in many instances, the relevant emotions may bring to
consciousness what was previously latent, revealing the subject’s “hidden
heart.” But one will not experience these emotions without some concern
and sensitivity. The upshot of this view is that at least some aspects of one’s
aesthetic taste are directly tied to one’s character. While a poor musical ear
or a lack of artistic ability are not failures of character, an utter lack of concern for and perceptual sensitivity to the value of the grandeur and beauty
in the world can be.57 Were a wealthy art collector to buy an original of one
of Monet’s Water Lilies, hang it on his bathroom wall, and wipe his hands
on the canvas when he couldn’t find a towel, it would seem appropriate to
blame him not only for mistreating an important historical-cultural artifact,
but also for failing to appreciate and respect the beauty of the piece. When
a couple of Boy Scout leaders recently took it upon themselves to topple
over an ancient rock formation in Utah’s Goblin Valley State Park because
it was precariously perched and presented a safety hazard to anyone who
might walk underneath it, many people were morally outraged by their
actions. Although most critics cited the public ownership of the park and
the hundreds of millions of years it took to form that particular rock formation as reasons against destroying it, they might also have cited the
value of the natural beauty of the park, to which each individual rock
formation contributes, as a reason why visitors ought not to tamper with
it. Cases like these reveal not only that the intentional destruction and
mistreatment of beautiful objects is blameworthy, but also that the failure
to perceive and appreciate the beauty of those objects through emotions
such as awe, admiration, affection, or delight can reflect a lack of virtue.58
3. Beauty as a Theistic Natural Sign
Our aim in this final section is to show how beauty can serve as a theistic
natural sign. To begin, recall the general features of theistic natural signs,
Exceptions include aesthetic insensitivities resulting from autism or brain damage.
We think the lack of aesthetic appreciation exhibited in these examples may be a deficiency not only of aesthetic character, but of moral and intellectual character as well. But one
could deny this controversial claim and still think these agents are normatively deficient as
persons. For one take on the distinctions and relationships between personal, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic worth, see Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and
Virtue Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chapters 6–7.
57
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as Evans develops the concept. Such signs are mental or physical pointers
which (1) give rise to both conceptions of and beliefs about God, (2) were
created by God (in part) in order to serve this function, (3) are grounded in
human nature, and (4) are widely accessible, yet easily resistible. We think
natural beauty meets this description.
First, natural beauty clearly gives rise both to conceptions of and beliefs
about God. Indeed, few features of the world do so more commonly. Reid
explains that the grandeur of “the earth, the sea, the planetary system,
the universe” are signs of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness.59 That
is, through various aesthetic emotions, people can perceive God in these
instances of grandeur in an immediate, non-inferential way. In this way,
natural grandeur points beyond itself to God’s grandeur, of which the
grandeur of nature is a mere reflection.
The language of “reflection” is importantly suggestive here. Just as we
can perceive another person indirectly by seeing her image in a mirror, so
too can we perceive God indirectly through the grandeur of the natural
world. Given that our aesthetic emotions often involve perception of the
excellence of the “mind behind the beauty,” there is a very real sense in
which God’s power, wisdom, and goodness can be manifested, expressed,
and reflected in the grandeur of his creation. Thus, it is not the case that
grandeur serves as evidence of God only when we take it to be such in an
act of quick, spontaneous inference. God also can appear to us as powerful,
wise, or good through our perception of the grandeur of nature. When
this happens, we perceive God himself, albeit indirectly. Of course, those
aesthetic emotions that do not involve perception of a mind behind the
beauty cannot function as indirect perceptions of God. Nevertheless, emotional perceptions of natural beauty commonly involve conception of the
artistic genius who created the beauty, even if not all do, and these can
function as indirect perceptions of God.
It is important to recall here that Reid’s notion that certain features of
the world suggest the reality of a mind behind them is not unique to God’s
case. As we’ve seen, Reid thinks natural signs enable our recognition of
all other minds. For instance, it is by way of such sensible signs as tone of
voice and facial expressions that we naturally and immediately form the
conception and belief that other humans are conscious. For Reid, grandeur can serve a similar function, giving rise to a conception of and belief
in the Mind behind the grandeur we see.
The same sorts of considerations apply to some forms of natural beauty
proper (i.e., non-grand beauty). For instance, Reid repeatedly notes that
certain features of nature are perfectly fitted for the flourishing of humans
and other creatures, and argues that this fittedness is a form of beauty that
points beyond itself to the wisdom and goodness of the Creator.60 In his
explanation of his own spiritual journey to Christianity, G. K. Chesterton
59
60

Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iii, 586–587.
See, e.g., Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII iv, 603, 604, 607, 608.
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recounts that his experience of the goodness of the created order was also
an (indirect) experience of the goodness of God, mediated by an emotion
we have not yet discussed: gratitude.
The test of all human happiness is gratitude; and I felt grateful, though I
hardly knew to whom. Children are grateful when Santa Claus puts in their
stockings gifts of toys or sweets. Could I not be grateful to Santa Claus when
he put in my stockings the gift of two miraculous legs? We thank people for
birthday presents of cigars and slippers. Can I thank no one for the birthday
present of birth?61

Chesterton’s feelings of gratefulness for his own existence seemed to
him to point to the existence of a great Giver of life. This is because the
emotion of gratitude, like the other emotions we have been exploring, is
more than a mere physiological feeling. To be sure, gratitude does have
a characteristically positive feel or affect; but gratitude also presents us
with information about the world. Gratitude is a complex perception of a
situation as involving at least three things: a good gift, a benevolent giver,
and oneself (or someone for whom one cares) as the beneficiary.62 In other
words, gratitude is a way of seeing or experiencing oneself as the recipient
of a good gift from a generous benefactor. Even if one has a justified true
belief that one has received such a gift, if one does not experience the emotion of gratitude, one has not fully appreciated the goodness of the gift or
the giver. For gratitude just is the mental state in which we are impressed
with the goodness of our having received this gift from this giver. By
extension, when we experience gratitude for a gift only God could give,
God’s goodness is being impressed on our hearts—we are (indirectly) perceiving God under the aspect benevolent giver.63
These examples might suggest to the reader that we are equating natural
beauty with something like fittedness for life, organized (or irreducible)
complexity, or design. Evans and Alvin Plantinga have both recently
highlighted the way in which the appearance of design might serve as a
kind of non-inferential basis for theistic belief, so it might be wondered
whether we are saying anything new.64 In response to this worry, while we
acknowledge that design in nature can be beautiful, we would point out
that many of our experiences of beauty are not perceptions of anything
like organized complexity or fittedness. Consider, for example, a colorful
panorama of autumn leaves, or a field of oats gracefully dancing on the
breeze. The beauty we perceive in such scenes is quite distinct from the
G. K. Chesterton, Heretics/Orthodoxy (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2000), 213.
Cf. Robert C. Roberts, Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2007), chapter 9.
63
Cf. Robert C. Roberts, “Cosmic Gratitude,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6:3
(Autumn 2014), 65–83, and Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God, 149–150.
64
See Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God, chapter 4, and Plantinga’s discussion of
“design discourse” in chapter 8 of Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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organized complexity and fittedness for life we might perceive in human
DNA, though surely we can learn to see such design as beautiful, too.
The foregoing discussion is merely suggestive of the many ways beauty
may give rise to emotional perceptions of God. Notice that both grandeur
and beauty proper can enable indirect perception of God and not merely
inferential belief in God. We think that Reid’s suggestion about the role
of emotions is instructive about how this works exactly, especially when
taken together with the perceptual view of emotions sketched above.
When we admire the beauty of a mountain vista or the grandeur of the
solar system, the proximate object of our admiration is the beautiful feature of nature itself. But when we experience the kind of admiration that
points beyond the proximate object to the excellent qualities of the mind
behind the object, the ultimate object of our admiration is God himself. In
our admiration, we non-inferentially see the wisdom, power, and goodness of the divine Artist as it is expressed and revealed in His creation.65
Here we disagree with C. S. Lewis, who rejects the possibility of directly
experiencing or knowing God through an experience of nature.66 Lewis
argues that experiences of nature can inform the concepts that we apply to
God, but denies that nature can put us in direct experiential contact with
God. He suggests that whatever excellence nature exhibits cannot point to
God because the glory of nature can be (and has been) misinterpreted as
evidence in support of false philosophies and theologies. But this seems
true of all evidence for God in the natural world, so it does not seem to
be a particular problem for our account of the evidential role of natural
beauty. Moreover, we do not think that the possibility of misperception or
misinterpretation undermines a natural sign’s ability to enable perception
of that which it (properly) signifies. Still, Lewis is right to worry about the
human tendency to idolize nature. It can be tempting, especially in the
absence of theistic background beliefs, to treat natural beauty or grandeur
as though it is the proper (ultimate or final) object of our emotions of devotion, but this can amount to a kind of nature worship. Since devotion is
properly felt toward a mind, feeling devotion toward nature is to confuse
the glory of nature for the glory of its Maker.67
In light of the way that beauty and grandeur often reflect the mind
responsible for their creation, the perception of natural beauty can immediately and non-inferentially give rise to conceptions of and beliefs
about God. But do we have reason to believe that, if God exists and created the world, God created natural beauty and grandeur, at least in part,
to serve this function? We think so. First, although the biblical authors
65
One implication of this is that aesthetic admiration and moral admiration might not be
entirely distinct emotion types.
66
C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt, 1988), 19–22.
67
Incidentally, devotion’s mind-directedness helps explain why the worship of “graven
images” is such an insidious form of idolatry. By feeling devotion toward and worshiping
the beauty and grandeur of idols of our own creation, we are, in effect, worshiping ourselves
as their creators (i.e., the minds behind their beauty).
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don’t explicitly mention natural beauty and grandeur as modes of God’s
self-revelation, it is plausible to think that they are among the features of
creation referred to generically as natural pointers to God (see, e.g., Psalm
19:1 and Romans 1:20). Furthermore, there is no good reason to deny that
God would use beauty, along with every other created excellence, to point
people to himself and to manifest his glory. Thus, natural beauty seems to
be as good a candidate as any to meet this criterion of theistic natural signs.
Given that natural beauty gives rise to conceptions of and beliefs about
God and was plausibly created by God in order to serve this function,
we have good reason to think that the non-inferential move from beauty
to God is grounded in human nature (contingent though it may be), not
mere convention. To see this, we can test the hypothesis by assuming it for
the sake of argument. If God exists, and created the beauty of the natural
world, and did so, at least in part, in order to make himself known, it
would make sense for God to constitute humans in such a way that we
would naturally move from the sign of beauty to the God signified by that
beauty. And, as Reid affirms in the epigraph above, we have no reason to
think this is not the case. Moreover, as Evans argues, contemporary cognitive science appears to support the claim that humans in fact have such a
God-recognizing faculty.68 This, of course, doesn’t prove that the faculty is
reliable, or that God exists.69 But the presence of such a faculty gives some
confirmation to the thesis that beauty can function as a theistic natural
sign, for the world turns out to be the way we would expect it to be if that
hypothesis were true.
Of course, this account rests on the highly controversial claim that
beauty is objective and, hence, there to be perceived in nature. Recognizing
the prevalence of disagreements concerning what counts as beautiful and
what beauty consists in, many (most?) people in our culture think beauty
is subjective, merely existing in the eye of the beholder in the strong relativistic sense of that phrase. N. T. Wright thus cautions that
Any account of beauty, and especially one which suggests that beauty is a
signpost pointing beyond itself, must take account, then, of the two things
about it which we have described. On the one hand, we must acknowledge
that beauty, whether within the natural order or within human creation,
is sometimes so powerful that it evokes our very deepest feelings of awe,
wonder, gratitude, and reverence. Almost all humans sense this some of the
time at least, even though they disagree wildly about which things evoke
which feelings and why. On the other hand, we must acknowledge that
these disagreements and puzzles are enough to press some, without an obvious desire to be cynical or destructive, to say that beauty is all in the mind,
or the imagination, or the genes.70
Evans, Natural Signs and Knowledge of God, 38–42.
Many atheists think the fact that we seem to be “hard-wired” to believe in God is evidence that such belief is irrational. For this claim, and Evans’s response, see ibid.
70
N. T. Wright, Simply Christian: Why Christianity Makes Sense (New York: HarperOne,
2006), 43–44.
68
69

PERCEIVING GOD THROUGH NATURAL BEAUTY

309

We think that our account of beauty and its role as a theistic natural sign
can explain both the emotion-evoking power of beauty and the temptation
to think of beauty as subjective. We have already discussed the former.
As to the latter worry about aesthetic subjectivism, Reid offers a compelling reply. On Reid’s view, the idea that beauty is objective is suggested
by common sense and ordinary language.71 When most people claim that
a rainbow is beautiful, for instance, they are making a claim about the
excellence of the rainbow itself, not merely about their rainbow-directed
feelings.72 Moreover, Reid notes that even aesthetic subjectivists still find
themselves using objective language to express themselves.73 In his view,
“no reason can be given why all mankind should express themselves thus,
but that they believe what they say.”74
Reid acknowledges that taste varies widely across people and cultures.
This variety, though, does not undercut the claim that beauty is objective.
After all, one could apply the argument from disagreement to any category of thought, yet we rightly recognize that there is a standard of truth
in other areas.75 Reid sees no reason to apply the argument from disagreement to aesthetic judgments alone. It may be the case that judgments of
taste vary more widely than other judgments, but Reid thinks the greater
variety can be accounted for when we consider the force of custom, education, habit, casual associations, etc., as well as differences in constitution.76
Thus, on Reid’s view, varying tastes are not mere differences of opinion
or preference; rather, one person may be right and the other wrong.77 A
person who delights in things that are actually beautiful is said to have a
more just or perfect taste. By contrast, a person who relishes that which
has no real excellence is said to have a depraved taste. As we explained
above, a person’s aesthetic taste and her character are not entirely distinct.
Moreover, we agree with Reid that taste may be improved and that even
the person of just taste is too dull to see all the beauty in the world.78 Thus,
we are not stuck with the sense of taste we currently have, but rather,
through emotional-perceptual training, can increasingly learn to see
beauty more rightly. In this way, our perception of beauty is sometimes an
acquired perception. Just as an oncologist can improve in her ability to see
cancer in a tissue sample, our ability to see beauty—and, we would add,
the God behind beauty—is susceptible to education.
Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII i, 574.
Cf. C. S. Lewis’s discussion of the sublime waterfall in his essay “Men Without Chests,”
in The Abolition of Man (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2001).
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Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII i, 577. For a discussion of this point, see Roger Pouivet,
“Thomas Reid’s Aesthetic Realism,” The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3:1 (2005): 35–45.
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Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII i, 577.
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Ibid., 576–577.
76
Ibid.
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Ibid., 575–576.
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Ibid. VIII iv, 595.
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Some are unpersuaded by Reid’s case for the objectivity of beauty. According to Theodore Gracyk, Reid simply “assumes that some [of our
aesthetic judgments] are [true] and offers a criterion for determining
which are correct, without answering the skeptic who denies that ‘beauty’
names any real quality.”79 But such a complaint misses the mark. Reid
does respond to the skeptic, though his response is not in the form of an
independent “criterion for determining which objects are beautiful,”80 or
even a reasoned argument. On Reid’s view, our belief in the objectivity
of beauty is a first principle of common sense, a foundationally justified
belief. As such, he seeks to persuade his readers of what he thinks they
already know by using what elsewhere he calls “ridicule.” On the persuasive role of ridicule, Reid states:
We may observe, that opinions which contradict first principles are distinguished from other errors by this; that they are not only false, but absurd:
And, to discountenance absurdity, Nature hath given us a particular emotion, to wit, that of ridicule, which seems intended for this very purpose of
putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or practice. This
weapon, when properly applied, cuts with as keen an edge as argument.
Nature hath furnished us with the first to expose absurdity; as with the last
to refute error. Both are well fitted for their several offices, and are equally
friendly to truth when properly used.81

Consider this example, just one of many in Reid’s essay, “On Taste,” in
which he uses ridicule to make his point:
There is therefore a just and rational taste, and there is a depraved and corrupted taste. For it is too evident, that, by bad education, bad habits, and
wrong associations, men may acquire a relish for nastiness, for rudeness,
and ill breeding, and for many other deformities. To say that such a taste is
not vitiated, is no less absurd than to say, that the sickly girl who delights
in eating charcoal and tobacco-pipes, has as just and natural a taste as when
she is in perfect health.82

Ultimately, such a statement functions like a reductio ad absurdum of the
subjective view of beauty; that is, it is intended to evoke emotions that
help the aesthetic skeptic to see the absurdity of his skepticism. (If Reid
were a Robertsian about emotions, he might say absurdity is one of the
terms in the “defining proposition” of the emotion ridicule evokes.) Such
a response may lack the argumentative rigor Gracyk desires, but given
Reid’s (and our) epistemology, it is a perfectly reasonable response to
the skeptic.83

Gracyk, “The Failure of Thomas Reid’s Aesthetics,” 477.
Gracyk demands such a criterion. See ibid., 477–478.
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Reid, Intellectual Powers VI iv, 462.
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Reid, Intellectual Powers VIII i, 576.
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For an extended treatment of the role of ridicule in persuasion, see Johnson and Pelser,
“Foundational Beliefs.”
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In sum, then, beauty is objective. The beauty of external objects occasions in the perceiver an agreeable emotion that (typically) gives rise to
the judgment that the object has some excellence. This view is embedded
in common sense and ordinary language, and is not undercut by the fact
that people’s tastes differ widely. Such variety can be accounted for in a
number of ways, and just goes to show that some people have a better
sense of taste than others.
The foregoing discussion reveals how natural beauty meets Evans’s
final criterion by being both widely accessible and easily resistible. Reid’s
point about the variety of beauty supports the accessibility of the sign. As
we’ve seen, beauty and grandeur can point to God, and both of these features are found in multifarious forms throughout nature. Thus, people of
all cultures and all ages have access to such signs. In a sense, though, not
all access is created equal. For, as we’ve noted, sensitivity to beauty—and
to the God behind the beauty—is, in part, a matter of both character and
background knowledge. Those with a properly oriented heart, or those
who already know something about God, may be able to see more via
theistic natural signs than others. As Alvin Plantinga notes,
[H]eightened affections enable us to see more of God’s beauty and glory;
being able to see more of God’s beauty and glory and majesty in turn leads
to heightened affection. There are certain things you won’t know unless you
love, have the right affections; there are certain affections you won’t have
without perceiving some of God’s moral qualities.84

As a result, it may be easy for those without the requisite affections, or
those who have not seen God elsewhere, to resist the natural sign embedded in natural beauty.85
The ease of such resistance is also evident in the popularity of deflationary accounts of beauty. The idea that beauty is simply in the eye of the
beholder has a long history and continues in popularity today. With such
an idea in one’s background beliefs, explaining away the experience of
beauty-as-a-theistic-natural-sign may be no difficulty at all.
This final point has some bearing on the question of how often beauty
in fact grounds knowledge of God. In making his case that natural signs
can ground such knowledge, Evans attempts a rapprochement between
so-called Reformed epistemologists and evidentialists. With the Reformed epistemologists, Evans thinks natural signs can function as direct,
non-inferential grounds for properly basic belief in God. With the evidentialists, Evans thinks natural signs, when recognized as natural signs, can
function as a form of evidence, and may serve as the basis for evidentialist
84
Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000),
303–304.
85
Even in cases where emotional perception of God requires background knowledge of
God, the emotion has epistemic value. If one already knows, say, that God is good, seeing
Him as good via one’s emotions adds both an independent layer of warrant to one’s belief,
and a level of appreciation that might otherwise be missing.
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arguments for God’s existence.86 Reid appears to think of beauty functioning primarily in the former (i.e., non-inferential) sense, and we are
inclined to agree that this is the more plausible route by which beauty
can ground knowledge of God. At the same time, though, the grandeur
of nature may stand behind some versions of the cosmological argument,
and the beauty found in the fittedness of nature to human flourishing
may stand behind some versions of the teleological argument.87 But given
the rampant subjectivism about beauty in our culture, arguing for God’s
existence explicitly in terms of objective, mind-rooted beauty may prove
rather difficult. Nonetheless, if the evidentialist wants to go that route, she
may be wise to follow Reid’s lead by seeking to disabuse people of their
subjectivism by way of a prudent use of ridicule.88
4. Conclusion
“Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God” (Matthew 5:8). In a
sense, we have suggested one way in which this claim from the Sermon
on the Mount may be true: those with the appropriate concerns and perceptual sensitivities are fitted to respond to the beauty of nature with the
proper emotions, and thereby may (indirectly) glimpse the divine Artist.
In other words, natural beauty can serve as a natural sign of God. As with
other theistic natural signs, the sign embedded in natural beauty is widely
accessible, but also easily resisted. Thus, although perceptions of natural
beauty may ground knowledge of God, they often fail to do so.89
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